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 The Debate on the Fourth Crusade 
Jonathan Harris 
Abstract 
This article examines attempts over the past two hundred years to account for the diversion of 
the Fourth Crusade to Constantinople and its sack of the city in 1204. While nineteenth-century 
scholars dreamed up far-fetched conspiracy theories, their successors often put the whole thing 
down to a series of unforeseen accidents. The debate now seems to have reached a stage where 
historians set the episode in a much wider context and consider a multitude of factors, though 
the element of chance will probably always have to feature. 
  
 
 2 
The Fourth Crusade and its diversion to Constantinople have generated endless debate and 
controversy, and there is no sign of it abating at the present time, especially as 2004 marks the 
eight-hundredth anniversary of the crusade's capture of Constantinople on 12 and 13 April 1204. 
Part of the fascination with the Fourth Crusade undoubtedly lies in the extraordinary reversal of 
its original intention. It was launched by Pope Innocent III in August 1198 with the aim of 
retaking Jerusalem from the Muslim Ayyubids whose leader Saladin had captured the city in 
1187. The leaders of the crusade formed a plan whereby a Venetian fleet would carry a large 
army of French knights to Egypt. Having conquered the country and thus neutralised the centre 
of Ayyubid power, the army would then march on Jerusalem. In the event, the expedition did 
quite the reverse. It never went to Egypt, and rather than capturing Jerusalem it stormed 
Constantinople, the largest and wealthiest city in the Christian world and capital of the 
Byzantine empire. Having done so, its troops, apparently forgetful of their vow as crusaders to 
fight for the Christian faith, mercilessly looted the city's churches and monasteries, prompting 
the embittered comment of one eye-witness, the Byzantine historian Niketas Choniates, that 
even the Saracens were more humane than 'those who had raised the cross to their shoulders'.1 
 The irony was not lost on contemporaries and a number of explanations were offered in 
the immediate aftermath of the event. From the Byzantine point of view, Niketas Choniates not 
surprisingly denounced the whole thing as deliberately planned aggression. He laid most of the 
blame on the Venetian doge, Enrico Dandolo, whom Choniates believed harboured a grudge for 
earlier Byzantine moves to restrict Venetian trading privileges in Constantinople. In Choniates' 
view, Dandolo entered into a conspiracy with Boniface, marquis of Montferrat and the other 
leaders of the crusade, to sail to Constantinople, using the proposed expedition to Egypt as a 
pretext for gathering the fleet. This attribution of a sinister role to the Venetians was by no 
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means restricted to the victims of 1204. An anonymous laudatory biography of Innocent III 
written in about 1208, the Deeds of Pope Innocent III, says much the same, clearly with a 
view to diverting any charge that the pope himself was to blame, since he, after all, had 
originally launched the expedition.2  
 Those involved with the crusade, however, had a spokesman and champion in Geoffrey 
of Villehardouin, himself a participant in the expedition and a confidant of some of its leaders. 
In a clear and concise account, written in his native French rather than in Latin, Villehardouin 
presented the progress of the crusade as a series of unfortunate accidents which all turned out to 
the good by the grace of God. Far from being a conspirator, Dandolo was 'a wise and able man'. 
The villains of the piece were those crusaders who failed to show up at Venice in the summer of 
1202 and to pay their passage money to the Venetians, thus leaving the expedition hopelessly 
under-financed. The crusade leaders therefore had no option but to accept the proposal of the 
Byzantine prince, Alexios Angelos, that they should accompany him to Constantinople to help 
restore his father, the emperor Isaac II, to his rightful throne, since Alexios promised to defray 
all the expenses of the expedition.3 Once Isaac and Alexios were placed back on the throne by 
the crusaders in August 1203, however, they proved slow in paying their debts. When, in 
January 1204, a new and uncooperative emperor, Alexios V Mourtzouphlos, seized power, the 
crusaders, in Villehardouin's view, had no choice but to attack. This viewpoint was broadly 
followed, with differing emphasis, in accounts by other western participants or by those 
connected with them.4 
 This is the abundant but contradictory source material on which, along with the letters of 
Innocent III and others,5 modern scholars have had to base their assessment of the Fourth 
Crusade. Given the clarity and coherence of Villehardouin's account, historical works written 
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before the mid-nineteenth century tended to take a his line on the diversion, accepting his 
version of events at face value. The French historian, Joseph Michaud (1767-1839), for example, 
gave little more than a summary of Villehardouin in his Histoire des Croisades and presented 
the whole episode as a series of accidents.  
 In the second half of the nineteenth century, however, historians adopted a more 
‘scientific’ approach to history, which involved a more critical use of their sources. As far as the 
Fourth Crusade was concerned, this frequently took the form of uncovering a supposed plot to 
make a diversion to Constantinople. Boniface of Montferrat, Enrico Dandolo, Innocent III and 
the claimant to the German imperial crown, Philip of Swabia, were all accused, with 
Villehardouin denounced either as either their co-conspirator or their dupe. It is very noticeable 
too that in the prevalent nationalistic atmosphere of the time, historians tended to exonerate what 
they saw as their own national group and blame someone else.6 
 Count Louis de Mas Latrie (1815-1897), for example, put forward the idea that his 
fellow Frenchmen were the victims of Venetian duplicity. Instead of relying on Villehardouin, 
he made greater use of Niketas Choniates and of Ernoul, who was writing in the Holy Land in 
the early thirteenth-century. Ernoul charged the Venetians with concluding a treacherous treaty 
with the Ayyubid sultan of Egypt, and Mas Latrie took this as the basis for his claim that the 
Venetians agreed to divert the crusade away from Egypt in return for lucrative trading 
agreements in Alexandria. This theory seemed proved beyond doubt in 1868 when Karl Hopf 
(1832-1873) published his claim that he had discovered the text of the very treaty mentioned by 
Ernoul between Venice and the sultan of Egypt, dated 13 May 1202.7 
 In 1877, however, the Venetian treason theory received a severe blow from an article 
published by Gabriel Hanotaux (1853-1944). Hanotaux showed conclusively that the treaty 
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referred to by Hopf could not have been concluded in 1202, and was much later, perhaps 
1208 or 1212.8 So well worked out was Hanotaux's argument that it put an end to the 
Venetian treason theory in that form among serious scholars. Nevertheless, it has survived up 
to the present in a number of popular works and, surprisingly, in Donald Nicol's Byzantium 
and Venice.9 So pervasive and persistent has it been that Donald Queller's 1977 account of 
the Fourth Crusade was largely written to refute it.10 
 Another strand in the web of treason theories dreamed up in the nineteenth century 
was to blame Philip of Swabia and the Germans. Count Paul Riant (1836-1888) made much 
of the claim in the Deeds of Innocent III and the Chronicle of Novgorod that Boniface of 
Montferrat had planned the diversion of the crusade to Constantinople as early as 1201, in 
concert with Philip. The plot was therefore simply a continuation of the aggressive policies of 
earlier German emperors, Philip's father, Frederick I Barbarossa (1152-1190) and his brother, 
Henry VI (1190-1197), towards the Byzantine empire.11 
 Finally, Pope Innocent III came in for his share of the blame. Achille Luchaire (1846-
1908) accepted Villehardouin’s claim that Innocent welcomed the treaty with Venice, and set 
aside the assertion of the Deeds of Innocent III that the pope had his reservations, as being 
something written with hindsight to protect Innocent’s reputation. Innocent, Luchaire argued 
was prepared to accept anything to keep the army together. In support of his thesis Luchaire 
cited Gunther of Pairis who says that the papal legate with the crusade, Peter of Capuano, 
refused to let Abbot Martin of Pairis abandon the crusade when he had doubts about the 
legitimacy of shedding Christian blood. The pope was therefore anxious publicly to 
discountenance the deed but was in fact eager to let it run its course, to profit from its 
consequences and to establish papal primacy over Constantinople.12 
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 As the twentieth century dawned, however, historians began to move away from the 
conspiracy theories and sought to explain the diversion in more impersonal terms. The debate 
entered a new phase with the publication of the work of Walter Norden. Norden advanced 
what might be called a modified theory of accidents, which was something of a synthesis of 
the theory of accidents and the treason theories. Rather than look at the crusade in isolation, 
Norden placed it in the context of Byzantine relations with the Latin West, starting with the 
Norman conquest of Southern Italy in 1071. The course of those relations meant that the idea 
of an attack on Constantinople was by no means startling and many western leaders had 
reasons for desiring it. No such attack was planned during the Fourth Crusade, however. It 
was merely that once the army was at Constantinople with an opportunity and provocation, 
the leaders naturally seized their chance. Thus the notion of accidents was kept without a 
facile reliance on Villehardouin.13 
 Norden’s ideas proved immensely influential, with subsequent commentators 
emphasising different aspects of his analysis. Following his placing of the Fourth Crusade in 
the wider context of East-West relations, many authors saw its outcome as the culmination of 
mounting incomprehension, intolerance and hostility between the two halves of the Christian 
world. This approach was central to the works of Sir Steven Runciman, who argued that the 
crusades had the unfortunate effect of bringing the two societies, which had had little to do with 
each other in the past, into much closer contact. It was this very contact which opened the way 
for mutual misunderstanding and mistrust, and ultimately for the sack of Constantinople in 1204. 
Runciman's vision of mounting hostility also appears in the work of his pupil, Donald Nicol, yet 
while both authors laid stress on a clash of cultures, Runciman genuinely believed in Byzantine 
superiority and therefore regarded the sack of Constantinople as one of the greatest crimes 
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against humanity in history. Nicol, on the other hand, was scathing about what he regarded as 
the 'snobbery' of the Byzantines and considered them to be at least partly to blame for their own 
fate because of their pig-headed refusal to come to terms with the reality of western military 
superiority.14 
 So convincing was the clash of civilisations theory that for a long time it seemed as if all 
there was left to discuss was when the tension had begun. Some historians saw the process as 
starting as far back as 1054, when some papal legates had excommunicated the patriarch of 
Constantinople and opened up the schism between the Byzantine and western churches. Others, 
including Runciman and Nicol, saw the arrival of the First Crusade at Constantinople in 1096 as 
the beginning of the trouble, as thousands of western knights descended on the Byzantine 
empire on their way to conquer Jerusalem, raising apprehensions among the Byzantines that 
these armies might in fact be aiming to conquer Constantinople or other parts of imperial 
territory. Still others claimed that the accession of the supposedly anti-Latin Andronicus I as 
Byzantine emperor in 1183 marked the starting point of mutual antagonism.15 
 The notion of escalating hostility between mutually estranged societies has not attracted 
everyone, however, and a number of flaws in the theory have been pointed out. In the first place, 
in spite of the frequent harsh words and occasional ugly incidents, Byzantium and western 
Europe were by no means completely estranged in the years before 1204. Not only did 
Byzantine emperors of the period of the crusades regularly intermarry with their counterparts in 
western Europe and the Latin states of Syria but their empire depended on western European 
manpower. As the Byzantines themselves were quite prepared to admit, Latins made up the 
most effective and loyal part of the imperial army, and they also served the emperor as 
ambassadors, translators and counsellors. Thus when the soldiers of the Fourth Crusade first 
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attacked the walls of Constantinople in the summer of 1203, they did so at the behest of the 
Byzantine prince, Alexios Angelos, while the stiffest resistance that they encountered came not 
from the Byzantines themselves but from the western European troops in imperial service. 
 A second flaw in the clash of civilisations theory is that it assumes not only that a 
complete East-West hostility had developed at some point during the twelfth century, but also 
that there was a causal link between that hostility and the sack of Constantinople. Yet when the 
western strike against Constantinople came, in the shape of the Fourth Crusade, there was no 
enthusiastic backing for the change of objective as one might expect. While individual leaders of 
the army might have welcomed the change of objective, most of the rank and file were bitterly 
opposed to it. A sizeable proportion left the army and made their own way to the Holy Land. 
Those who remained only agreed very reluctantly to the diversion when subjected to a mixture 
of financial and emotional blackmail. Even then, many hesitated before the final attack in April 
1204, and had serious doubts as to whether it was legitimate to attack a Christian city in this 
way.16 
 The third weakness in the clash of civilisations theory is what happened after 1204. If the 
mutual antagonism was as sharp as supposed, why was it that so few westerners were prepared 
to heed the pope’s summons and to fight to maintain Constantinople under Latin rule? Because 
only small numbers of volunteers went out to help Baldwin of Flanders and his successors to 
defend the city, the Latin emperors suffered from a constant shortage of manpower and that their 
hold on Constantinople lasted only fifty-seven years. By 1261 the Byzantines had recaptured 
Constantinople and recovered a sizeable part of their empire, as it had been before 1204.17 
 Finally, it has been pointed out that although it was the western crusaders who sacked 
Constantinople and dismembered the empire, the process of disintegration had begun long 
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before, and had become particularly marked after the death of Emperor Manuel I in 1180. In the 
Balkans a rebellion had broken out among the Vlachs and Bulgars in 1185-6 and their leaders 
Peter and Asen ultimately established an independent realm based on Preslav and Trnovo. In 
other areas such as Cyprus, local magnates were seizing power and defying the authority of 
the emperor in Constantinople. These factors have been closely studied by Michael Angold 
and Paul Stephenson and their work needs to be considered very carefully before any 
assertion is made that Byzantium fell victim to western aggression: the empire may well have 
broken up of its own accord.18 
 In view of these flaws in the clash of civilisations theory, it is hardly surprising that 
many scholars have discarded the idea that the Fourth Crusade's sack of Constantinople was the 
culmination of mounting hostility and have come to the conclusion that it came about as a kind 
of accident, taking up another strand in Norden's theory. Proponents of this view lay stress on 
the unforeseen events which prevented the crusade from going on to Egypt as planned: the 
massive debt which was owed to the Venetians because not enough crusaders came forward to 
fill the ships that had been hired, the attack on Zara which the crusade undertook to secure a 
postponement of that debt, and the proposal made by Alexios Angelos that the crusade should 
accompany him to Constantinople. The sweeping notion of mounting hostility or indeed any 
overall thesis as to why relations broke down so completely is largely ignored by this school of 
thought.19 
 During 2003, two books appeared which offered alternatives both to the clash of 
civilisations and the series of accidents theories. Jonathan Harris has presented the sack of 
Constantinople as the outcome of an attempt on the part of the Byzantine ruling elite to 
implement and sustain their traditional ideology and foreign policy in circumstances which 
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left their actions open to misinterpretation in the eyes of western Europeans. By pursuing 
very different ends to those of the reformed papacy and the leaders of crusade armies, and by 
employing methods that were often considered by western Europeans to be dishonourable, 
the Byzantines succeeded in giving the impression that the empire was failing to participate 
in the pious cause of defending Jerusalem and the Holy Land from the common Muslim foe. 
During the twelfth century, as the enormity of the resources required to hold Jerusalem for 
Christianity became clear, voices were raised in the West for Byzantium to be made to 
contribute part of its enormous wealth to the defence of the Holy Land. Thus while there was 
no grand plan to conquer Constantinople, western attempts after 1187 to extort what they 
considered to be the rightful Byzantine financial contribution to the crusade enterprise, led 
directly to aggression against Byzantium, the first occasion being the annexation of Cyprus 
by Richard the Lionheart during the Third Crusade in 1191. The diversion of the Fourth 
Crusade to Constantinople in 1203 came after Alexios Angelos promised just such a financial 
contribution and the city was stormed and sacked when the crusaders feared that it would not 
be forthcoming.20 
 Secondly, Michael Angold has offered a thesis which attempts to reconcile some of the 
ideas of his predecessors. For Angold, the sack of Constantinople was the result both of long-
term factors and short-term accidents. On the one hand, the period leading up to 1204 was 'a 
struggle between two civilisations in the course of which each acquired a clearer sense of 
identity'. The Byzantines had, during the twelfth century, failed to come to terms with the 
paradox that their empire was dependent on the very westerners who were often denounced as 
the greatest threat to its existence. The story of the crusade itself, on the other hand, was one of 'a 
thousand or more decisions, often at cross-purposes' made by the leadership of the crusade, often 
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on the spur of the moment and on the basis of little useful information.21 
 Finally, during the Fourth Crusade's anniversary year, Jonathan Phillips' The Fourth 
Crusade and the Sack of Constantinople provided a new narrative account based on the latest 
research. The second half of the book is largely given over to dramatic and readable descriptions 
of battles, but the earlier chapters place the Fourth Crusade in the context of the crusade ethos as 
a whole as it had developed over the previous century. Whatever the excesses committed during 
the sack of Constantinople, Phillips sees the crusaders of 1204 as acting within a closely defined 
and deeply felt code of honour which prompted them to resent very deeply what they considered 
to be the betrayal of his solemn promises by Alexios Angelos.22 
 As long ago as 1878, Paul Riant announced that the debate on the Fourth Crusade and 
its diversion to Constantinople had now reached a point where it was not worth pursuing 
further, unless new documentation was discovered.23 His burial of the controversy proved to 
be premature, although there are still those who regard the whole thing as 'endless and 
pointless'.24 Endless the discussion may be, pointless it is not. Human beings have always 
been fascinated by the question of the extent to which they create and mould events or 
whether they are trapped by impersonal force of circumstance. The diversion of the Fourth 
Crusade provides a fascinating case study of this question as it can be seen as the result either 
of cunning planning and manipulation or of forces over which the participants had no control. 
As long as human beings maintain an interest in their own ability to shape their historical 
destiny, therefore, the debate will continue.  
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